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PART 1: STRUCTURE AND BACKGROUND 
The eighth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on strategic nuclear 
issues was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from June 8 to 10, 2014. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; 
it is formally unofficial but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The 
dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency’s (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) 
at NPS. For the third time, this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China 
Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). This “non-governmental” association, 
with close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
helped improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain 
topics. 
 
The goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions 
regarding each side’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation 
or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. This year, 13 participants on 
the Chinese side—the largest delegation ever—included a mix of active and retired senior PLA 
officers, officials from the MFA and Ministry of National Defense (MND), experts from 
government-run civilian Chinese think tanks, and a scholar from a Chinese university. In 
comparison to previous years, the Chinese side’s participation was boosted considerably by the 
inclusion of more senior participants with relevant military expertise.  The U.S. side included 
observers from the State Department, the Joint Staff, PACOM, STRATCOM, National Defense 
University (NDU), Global Strike Command, DTRA, and participants from think tanks, such as 
Pacific Forum CSIS, and universities, such as the University of Pennsylvania. In total, there were 
more than 25 American participants.  
 
One of the goals of this series of meetings is to create a community of regular participants 
who develop accumulated learning and the personal trust needed to facilitate a more open 
discussion. This effort met with much success this year in candid and substantive discussions 
that were not adversely affected by the then-tense tenor of the overall bilateral relationship. 
 
The meeting was organized around four substantive panels, a set of breakout groups on 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), and a plenary session on CSBMs. The four 
panels examined “Common Challenges and the Evolving Nuclear Strategic Environment,” 
“Developments in Nuclear Modernization and Strategic Postures,” “Managing Crises and 
Avoiding Escalation,” and “Evolving Views on Missile Defense.” These topics as well as the 
proposed CSBMs were developed in close coordination with officials on both sides before the 
meeting and the dialogue’s outcomes are routinely outbriefed within both governments.  
 
The following pages examine the discussions and presentations with a focus on the 
narrative of Chinese perceptions and statements aired at the meeting. The report then proceeds to 





PART 2: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS	  
 
General Perceptions of the U.S.-China Relationship 
The overall tenor of the meeting was less tense than expected. Given the ongoing 
confrontations in the South and East China Seas, Justice Department indictments of PLA officers 
for cyber activities, and antagonistic exchanges between defense officials at the recent Shangri-
La Dialogue, the U.S. side expected a more confrontational Chinese approach and more 
boilerplate criticisms of American behavior. Instead, there was no mention of the “three 
obstacles” in bilateral military relations and little discussion of maritime disputes. The Chinese 
side emphasized the existence of a trust deficit between Beijing and Washington regarding 
uncertain intentions, but also repeatedly accepted the legitimacy of America’s traditional security 
role in the region. For instance, one Chinese participant stated, “We don’t oppose continued U.S. 
presence; we don’t challenge primacy.” 
 
Chinese assessments of the U.S. “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific were less critical than in 
past dialogues. Positively from a U.S. perspective, Chinese participants often saw the strategy as 
enhancing U.S. capabilities and influence in the region—a stated goal of the rebalance. Some 
participants criticized the rebalance as a source of continuing bilateral tension and encouraging 
provocations by U.S. allies. Yet, these criticisms were relatively muted and still combined with 
an acceptance of America’s traditional security presence and an emphasis on building a 
cooperative relationship.  
 
Overall, while trouble spots persist in the relationship, the Chinese side repeatedly 
emphasized cooperation, common interests, and the “new type of major country relations” (新型
大国关系) concept as a way to overcome the trust deficit. In part, the dialogue’s “unofficial” 
status and a familiarity among the participants helped keep conversations from delving into 
unhelpful rhetoric or talking points.   That said, Chinese participants also believed there was a 
limited chance that similar strategic nuclear discussions could occur at the Track 1 level.  
 
China’s Regional Relations and Threat Perceptions 
North Korea: In a shift from relative optimism about the prospects for denuclearization in 
previous dialogues, Chinese participants emphasized that North Korean nuclear weapons were 
now a fact and denuclearization was unlikely. According to one Chinese participant, “North 
Korea is unshakeable in its determination to develop nuclear weapons” and has made progress in 
developing its arsenal. Another suggested that it would be “almost impossible to denuclearize the 
DPRK” and “Chinese and Americans will have to be practical on this point.” Chinese 
participants viewed Kim Jong-Un as a young, unpredictable, and inexperienced leader. One 
expert stated, “we don’t know where its young leader is leading the country.” This expert further 
suggested that a fourth nuclear test was probable. Another Chinese participant suggested 
restarting the six-party talks, but unlike previous dialogues, even this expert did not seem 
particularly optimistic about the prospects for success; no other Chinese participant referred to 
the six-party talks. The Chinese emphasized that China, in concert with the United States, was 
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doing all it could to manage the North Korean problem, but there was a realization of limited 
effectiveness in these efforts. 
 
Japan: Chinese participants expressed widespread fears about the future directions of 
Japanese national security policy, especially under the Abe administration. These concerns 
included potential constitutional revision or reinterpretation of collective self-defense, challenges 
to the post-World War II regional order, a loosening of weapons exports restrictions, and missile 
defense cooperation with the United States and others. Japan’s nuclear weapons potential was 
especially concerning for the Chinese since they fear hidden Japanese stockpiles of weapons-
grade material and the country’s ability to rapidly nuclearize. Chinese worries were focused 
much more on Japan as an independent actor than on problems raised by the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Unlike in past engagements, the Chinese did not push for Washington to restrain or control 
Japanese foreign and defense policy, perhaps realizing that such an approach was not feasible.  
 
India: The existence of Chinese concerns vis-à-vis India in the nuclear realm have long 
been dismissed by Chinese interlocutors in these dialogues. The pattern continued this year. 
According to one Chinese nuclear expert, “China knows for certain that nuclear deterrence works 
well between China and India.”  
 
Taiwan: In keeping with recent dialogues, Taiwan was barely mentioned by the Chinese, 
even when raised by Americans. In discussing the threats driving China’s own missile defense 
system, a Chinese military scholar referred to threats from “other countries and neighbors in the 
region,” indirectly referring to Taiwan. The only direct mention came in a presentation on 
missile defense by another Chinese scholar who questioned whether the PAVE PAWS radar 
system in Taiwan would enhance America’s ability to observe the countermeasure deployment 
process of Chinese missiles during a conflict. If so, the participant argued that PAVE PAWS 
would improve America’s capability to intercept Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) since U.S. shooters could distinguish early on between actual weapons and decoys. 
Relatedly, some Chinese suggested PAVE PAWS possessed more capability than Taiwan could 
make use of by itself. 
 
Russia: Given recent developments, such as possible Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty violations and events in Ukraine, American participants repeatedly pushed the 
Chinese side for its views on these developments and how they were affecting Sino-Russian 
relations. However, the Chinese emphatically denied that any of these developments were 
leading to an enhanced perception of the Russia threat or new challenges in the relationship. One 
Chinese expert suggested that relations were at their “best in history.” Other Chinese participants 
argued that good political relations mitigated any concerns they might see from Russian missile 
and nuclear modernization. Russian INF Treaty violations were dismissed or not acknowledged. 
One expert suggested that China’s concerns about these violations were “not as serious as some 
of my American friends would think.” Another repeated the Russian view that because these 
capabilities were for test purposes and not operational, they did not represent a genuine violation. 
Another Chinese expert repeated a point made in earlier dialogues that extreme Russian 
assessments of China’s nuclear capabilities are not genuine, but are made because Russia does 
not want to reduce its nuclear forces any further; similar points were made to explain away 
Russian demands for multilateral participation in arms control negotiations.  
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Chinese participants repeatedly raised the issue of closer Sino-Russian cooperation and 
the potential that U.S. behavior might drive the two countries closer together. At the broader 
level, a Chinese expert argued that America was making several strategic mistakes in its foreign 
policy, with one effect being the driving of China and Russia closer together. In the strategic 
nuclear context, the issue of Sino-Russian cooperation came up repeatedly in discussions of 
potential cooperation on BMD. In response to a question, a Chinese participant said that China 
and Russia did not share technology or more specific information on BMD systems. After some 
further discussion, however, the Chinese participant returned to this issue and suggested that the 
above statement “doesn’t mean China and Russia won’t or can’t develop more cooperation on 
BMD.” 
 
Views of the Broader Nuclear Environment 
The Chinese side characterized their assessment of the non-proliferation environment as 
unchanged over the last five years, but the discussion of recent developments in this realm 
seemed to reveal a more negative and pessimistic assessment. First, as mentioned earlier, North 
Korea poses a challenge with no easy solution. Second, the existing non-proliferation regimes do 
not seem capable of dealing with increased challenges. One Chinese expert characterized 
existing non-proliferation regimes, specifically the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
(NPT RevCon) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as “not powerful enough” to stop 
“ambitious actors” from developing nuclear weapons. Another Chinese participant added that the 
NPT had failed to achieve many of its declared objectives in the last NPT RevCon. Third, 
Chinese participants relayed mixed messages on Iran. While they noted the progress made by 
P5+1 negotiations, they also saw transparency as an incomplete solution and suggested long-
term Iranian technological intentions were unchanged. 
 
Views on the U.S. Nuclear Posture 
A Chinese participant argued that unlike its stable relations with every other nuclear 
power, U.S.-China relations remained “bumpy” and issues and concerns persisted in the strategic 
nuclear relationship. Reflecting an understanding of developments in U.S. nuclear policy since 
the 2010 NPR, the expert recognized that the United States had reduced its reliance on nuclear 
weapons and was reducing its nuclear forces in line with New START; but the participant also 
questioned whether future momentum could be maintained. Unlike previous dialogues, increased 
U.S. funding for nuclear infrastructure maintenance and development was not specifically raised 
or criticized. 
 
However, Chinese participants noted recent American arsenal modernization efforts that 
were a source of concern. One referred to: 1) conventional capabilities that may strike China’s 
nuclear arsenal (including hypersonic and space-based weapons); 2) BMD capabilities (increased 
numbers of ground-based interceptors (GBIs)); and 3) modernization of the nuclear triad (which 
would provide “thinner but stronger legs”). Generally, prompt global strike and related systems 
were mentioned but not emphasized. 
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In terms of doctrinal changes, a Chinese participant observed that the June 2013 Nuclear 
Employment Guidance had reduced the prominence of launch under attack, but the expert also 
questioned whether DOD retained the ability to do so, noted this seeming contradiction, and 
asked for clarification on current U.S. thinking on launch under attack. This was the first time 
such concerns have been raised. 
 
Chinese Strategic Forces 
While the Chinese side often refers to the vague language in their Defense White Paper 
on a “lean and effective nuclear force” (精干有效的核力量), Chinese participants went into 
greater detail than in previous dialogues regarding the range of ongoing and potential 
developments in China’s nuclear policy. One Chinese expert characterized these ongoing efforts 
as working towards: 1) better survivability; 2) improved early warning; 3) improved penetration 
to overcome BMD; and 4) robust BMD research and development. Potential moves to enhance 
survivability included concealment, dispersion, hardening, and mobility. Potential moves to 
enhance penetration included developing “more weapons pieces” and diversifying their means of 
delivery. A Chinese participant also referred to the need to enhance the precision of both 
conventional and nuclear missiles. This participant also defined deterrence credibility as 
requiring survivable forces that could penetrate and create “huge damage” that would be 
“unbearable.”  
 
In previous meetings, China’s arsenal size has been discussed, but it did not feature 
prominently this year. Chinese participants noted that there was no set ceiling for China’s 
nuclear weapons, but also that the size of its nuclear forces was reactive and related to the 
nuclear, conventional, and BMD capabilities of others. One Chinese participant was even more 
direct, arguing that requirements for force sizing depended on U.S. BMD capabilities. This 
expert suggested that if U.S. BMD capabilities could intercept 200 missiles, China would need to 
develop 300 missiles, and if the U.S. could intercept 500, China would need to develop 600. The 
requirement of 100 missiles that could penetrate was much higher than Chinese participants have 
raised in the past, but the emphasis on an interaction between the capabilities of others and 
China’s arsenal size has been repeatedly emphasized.   
 
In the limited discussion on targeting, Chinese participants suggested that Chinese 
counter-attacks would be counter-value. In part, counter-value appears more attractive because 
China currently lacks the capability to achieve a counter-force strike. One Chinese expert’s 
suggestion that China needed to enhance its precision led to some questions about the potential 
for counter-force options. The participant emphasized that enhanced precision would be “for 
humanitarian purposes.” It was unclear whether such precision would be consistent with the 
Chinese concept of key point counterstrikes (重点反击) or earlier pronouncements that Chinese 
second strikes needed to be “unbearable.” Chinese SSBNs were also characterized as having 




Chinese participants discussed their SSBN program in much greater detail than before. 
They openly referred to the importance of their SSBNs for promoting stability and providing 
deterrence. A Chinese participant characterized SSBNs as more survivable than silo-based or 
even mobile ICBMs and suggested that a reliable SSBN force would serve to stabilize nuclear 
relations. Another indicated that China’s current generation of SSBNs, the Jin class, are quite 
noisy and therefore might not be stabilizing, though this Chinese expert noted that future variants 
might be quieter and enhance stability. In addition, the participant commented that the launch 
azimuths of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could contribute to penetrability by 
complicating early warning: SLBMs originating from areas not covered by U.S. BMD radars 
would be inherently harder to detect and destroy, namely from locations in the Central and 
Southern Pacific. 
 
In response to a question about what would constitute a reliable SSBN force, a Chinese 
expert responded that such a force would need to “get out to the great ocean through the few 
water channels” and possess constant, reliable communications. This idea of deploying out into 
deep water differs from concepts presented in earlier dialogues, such as the possibility of a 
bastioning strategy for its SSBNs. One Chinese participant also viewed SSBNs as a form of 
“strategic power projection,” which was tied, if tenuously, to the need for a reliable second-strike 
capability. This participant also argued, as noted previously, that SLBMs possessed less accuracy 
and were therefore not counter-force weapons, although it was unclear what generation of 
missiles was being referred to. 
 
The Chinese side also recognized that command and control (C2) for SSBNs would 
become an increasingly important issue to resolve. They acknowledged that their military and 
strategic community had not yet fleshed out the procedures or technology to provide robust and 
reliable C2. These extensive discussions on SSBNs in Hawaii showed that many key issues have 
not yet been decided but also revealed that these issues were under serious debate and 
consideration back in China. 
 
Other Chinese Strategic Force Developments 
For the first time in this series of meetings, the Chinese raised the importance of early 
warning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets for the defense of 
China’s strategic forces. Such capabilities were viewed as contributing to effective deterrence by 
allowing for “prompt” and “agile” counterattacks.  
 
There was also somewhat more discussion about China’s own BMD efforts. A Chinese 
expert referred to a need for robust research and development on BMD to enhance China’s 
ability to deploy and develop a more comprehensive system should the need arise. This reference 
to possible deployment of a BMD system differed from past dialogues where the Chinese only 
emphasized the technical aspects of their BMD program. As referenced earlier, in discussions of 
the threats that drove China’s BMD program, one Chinese participant referred to regional 
offensive missile developments, including an indirect reference to potential threats from Taiwan. 
Although still limited, there was more discussion of hypersonic weapons by the Chinese side. 
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One participant noted that hypersonic weapons could be a useful response to U.S. BMD 
capabilities.  
 
Chinese Nuclear Doctrine 
Reacting to the considerable controversy after China’s 2012 Defense White Paper failed 
to include a reference to its no-first-use (NFU) policy, a Chinese participant promised that “it 
will certainly be in the next White Paper.” Pronouncements of NFU were repeated at the 
dialogue, but this did not dominate or detract from substantive discussions.  
 
Chinese participants emphasized that China did not have any new official policy 
documents about the evolution of its nuclear policy. Nonetheless, questions about the 2013 
edition of the Science of Strategy (战略学), published by the Academy of Military Science 
(AMS), led to some new insights into ongoing nuclear policy discussions. An American 
participant asked for clarification about references in the nuclear section of this book regarding 
launch-on-warning posture and the possibility of controlling the scope and scale of nuclear 
counter-attacks. A Chinese expert responded that there were ongoing discussions about launch-
on-warning, as reflected in the volume, but the participant’s view was that China was unlikely to 
adopt such an approach. Separately, the participant more vehemently rebutted the notion of a 
concept of controlling nuclear war (also alluded to in the Science of Strategy). According to this 
participant, such a concept would contradict with the discussion of counter-value responses, 
which was prominent in earlier parts of that volume. 
 
As in previous meetings, the U.S. side raised concerns over Chinese co-mingling/co-
locating of conventional and nuclear weapons. Here, the concern was that attacks on 
conventional systems might inadvertently hit nuclear weapons, thus potentially escalating a 
conflict (or signaling to the Chinese that the United States was engaged in a counter-force strike 
more generally). One U.S. participant suggested that deliberate signaling that such a co-mingling 
had occurred could be useful as a means to deter attacks on conventional capabilities in the first 
place. The Chinese side flatly denied that co-mingling occurred, but the discussion was not 
specific with regard to the firing unit, brigade, or larger “base” levels (“base” could include a 
very large expanse of territory). The co-mingling of C2 for nuclear and conventional forces was 
also denied. In response to a question on China’s nuclear and conventional weapons’ lines of 
authority, a Chinese participant stated that, for nuclear forces, orders ran from the 
President/Central Military Commission (CMC) to the Second Artillery to the Firing Unit. For 
conventional forces, orders ran from the President/CMC to the General Staff Department to the 
Military Region then down to the Firing Unit.  
 
The U.S. side repeatedly raised concerns about inadvertent escalation, especially as a 
result of such co-mingling. Chinese participants were surprised that such concerns were so 
prominent. In response, the Chinese strongly denied that they had any intentional desire for 
manipulating risk by pursuing the deterrent value of co-mingling. One Chinese referred to such a 




Views on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense 
American BMD capabilities remained a significant concern for China and were seen as a 
driver for a range of its modernization efforts. In particular, Chinese interlocutors pointed to U.S. 
THAAD and X-Band radar deployments, as well as an increase in the number of GBIs in Alaska, 
as evidence of the threat posed to its nuclear deterrent. The core issue for a range of Chinese 
participants was that integrated C2ISR networks involving forward-based systems, plus 
associated interceptors in theater, might greatly enhance U.S. national missile defense 
capabilities.     
 
A Chinese expert argued that while the United States views its regional and national 
missile defense architectures separately, the Chinese view these systems as highly integrated. 
This participant also emphasized how regional BMD systems might undermine China’s nuclear 
deterrent when viewed comprehensively. Hence, U.S. and allied BMD deployments in the region 
continue to fuel Chinese threat perceptions. 
 
During the dialogue, several Chinese participants warned against the deployment of a 
THAAD system in South Korea. Chinese experts repeatedly denied that North Korean missile 
developments could reasonably explain the need for enhanced BMD capabilities and deployment 
of THAAD to South Korea. In addition, Chinese participants argued that deployments of 
regional BMD capabilities could challenge China’s strategic deterrent. A suggestion by a U.S. 
participant that China observe THAAD radar installations to see that the equipment could not 
easily be retargeted toward China was rebuffed as insufficient to reassure China. 
 
Some Chinese expressed concerns that regional-based radars and sensors could provide 
cueing for U.S. national BMD interceptors. In particular, these regional systems could assist in 
target discrimination against countermeasures after the warhead and decoys/countermeasures 
separated from the booster, but before they left the atmosphere. Regional sensors could 
distinguish payload component weights and thus identify decoys. In addition, the Chinese feared 
a separate role for forward-deployed SM-3 block IIAs on Aegis ships that could intercept 
Chinese ICBMs and SLBMs, providing enhanced shoot-look-shoot opportunities. Despite all of 
the above concerns, multiple Chinese participants saw BMD as politically unstoppable in the 
United States, in part due to strong congressional support. Chinese participants repeated their 
claims that they did not consider BMD developments to be a reasonable strategic response to 
North Korean and Iranian threats. 
 
Toward the end of the dialogue, one Chinese expert made outlier comments expressing 
confidence in China’s ability to deal with U.S. BMD. Referencing conversations with Russian 
experts, the participant suggested that Russia and China could destroy GPS satellites, which 
would supposedly damage American BMD capabilities. These abilities included counter-space 
activities that other Chinese participants recognized to be profoundly escalatory. This Chinese 
expert also indicated that China could negate the BMD threat by attacking radar systems in 
South Korea and Japan. Other tools to defeat BMD, such as countermeasures, were discussed but 
no details were provided. In general, the Chinese side has started to discuss increasing 
penetrability through a variety of measures including technical countermeasures, decoys, and 
“increased weapons pieces.” One participant, rather awkwardly, also made the point that U.S. or 
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allied missile defense intercepts could expand and/or escalate a conflict beyond a previously 
bilateral engagement (likely meaning that U.S. involvement in a Sino-Japanese conflict through 
use of BMD systems would expand the war to include the United States).   
 
U.S.-China Crisis Stability and Management 
One of the main features at this year’s dialogue was a panel on “Managing Crises and 
Avoiding Escalation.” A Chinese expert stated that “crisis escalation has gotten greater attention 
by the Chinese government,” and crisis management has been studied by experts in the PLA. 
The Chinese side views crises as dangerous affairs, not opportunities. Contrary to views by some 
on the U.S. side that China manufactures and manipulates crises to its advantage, the Chinese 
side expressed concerns about the U.S. creating, manipulating, and benefitting from crises. One 
Chinese participant also admitted that China’s government faced decision-making challenges in 
crises, implying that it suffered from convoluted decision-making processes. Consequently, this 
participant concluded that China was unable to “control” crises.  
 
A Chinese expert argued that misperception and miscalculation were two main sources of 
danger in crises. This participant defined misperception to include incomplete information and 
bounded rationality. Areas of potential miscalculation included: 1) strategic capabilities; 2) 
strategic intentions; and 3) strategic principles and operational roles, which included cross-
domain and other issue sets. Chinese participants also cited ambiguous communications and the 
potential for third parties to initiate a crisis as other primary dangers.  
 
In discussions of how both sides might behave in a crisis, one Chinese participant cited a 
range of potential “anti-coercion operations” that China could take. These were explicitly drawn  
from the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (第二炮兵战役学) and included “signaling 
resolve via public media; raising alert status of nuclear forces; demonstrating nuclear 
capabilities; troops maneuvering and exercising; missile flight test; close-in/fly-over test; 
declaring nuclear targeting point.”  American participants suggested that such steps could be 
viewed as provocative and potentially lead to inadvertent escalation, although Chinese 
participants rejected any notion that these steps were escalatory. 
 
The panel also included discussions on how to increase crisis stability. One Chinese 
participant proposed several potential “solutions” to reduce the risks of inadvertent nuclear 
escalation. One potential solution, which would address American concerns, would include 
separating nuclear and conventional weapons; but the participant noted that this would 
undermine survivability. The participant also proposed modifying China’s NFU policy to 
consider conventional attacks on nuclear weapons as nuclear attacks. For the participant this was 
a “logical solution” to the risks of inadvertent escalation. This expert also proposed several steps 
the United States might take to reduce the risks of inadvertent escalation, such as declaring anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) free zones, unilateral restraints on BMD and prompt global strike 
(PGS), and the acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability. One Chinese participant suggested that 
increased economic interdependence would enhance crisis stability and another participant 
argued that quiet, backchannel diplomacy (in line with Brent Scowcroft’s back channel 
diplomacy in previous Sino-American crises) could help stabilize or mitigate a crisis. In the past, 
both sides have discussed developing a list of signals one might send in a crisis to enhance 
13	  	  
familiarity on both sides. Such a project may become of increasing importance in the future 
given the discussions at this year’s meeting. 
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PART 3: CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES 
This year, participants and observers at the dialogue were split into three breakout groups 
to discuss CSBMs proposed by participants from both sides during previous sessions of the 
dialogue. The groups discussed and evaluated three specific measures, with the aim of making 
recommendations as to which CSBMs could be effectively explored at the official Track 1 level.  
The discussion for each CSBM was organized around the objective, importance, pros and cons 
from each side, alternative measures, and future steps for implementation. These CSBMs were 
divided into declaratory steps (such as a joint statement on strategic stability) and concrete 
programs (such as reciprocal visits to BMD sites or tests). The CSBMs were mostly mutual and 
cooperative steps. Unilateral assurances are certainly worthy of further discussion, but these have 
the added challenge of determining appropriate reciprocity. The following pages examine the 
discussions on each CSBM. 
 
Three common themes emerged in these discussions. First, for the joint statements on 
strategic stability, both sides acknowledged a potential incompatibility between such statements 
and the nature of the bilateral relationship. They might be crassly viewed as “ground rules for 
major Sino-American war.” Experts from both sides noted that declarations on how each side 
would behave during a military crisis or war, even if meant to be reassuring, are inconsistent 
with the ongoing emphasis by both governments to develop a positive and cooperative 
relationship (both through the Sunnylands summit and the “new model of major power 
relations”). While this need not preclude further discussion, as described below, it may require 
adroit casting to ensure such belligerent overtones are avoided. 
 
Second, the more promising concrete CSBMs seem likely to be more one-sided and 
include more steps by the U.S. side. For example, any mock inspection, notifications of 
BMD/long-range strike system tests, or exchanges on verification procedures that are led by the 
U.S. may have the appearance of being unbalanced and not reciprocal. It should be noted that 
such measures, even though they require more steps from the U.S. side, also provide benefits for 
the United States. First and foremost, they facilitate engagement with precisely the right sort of 
operationally connected actors the United States has struggled to engage with.  Second, some of 
the communities in the Chinese system (such as the Second Artillery Arms Control Department) 
would likely take a more prominent role within China because of such engagements, which 
would be a positive outcome.  Finally, as has been shown in a range of exchanges and through 
some Chinese publications on arms control, the understanding of such issues is relatively thin in 
China.  Deepening that understanding serves American interests. 
 
Finally, Chinese consideration of these widely disparate CSBMs showed how the NFU 
declaratory policy constrains Chinese strategic thinking. Even steps that might be regarded as 
tying U.S. hands were viewed primarily through the lens of their potential to undermine or raise 
questions about China’s NFU. Separately, concerns were raised several times on whether 




Measure 1: Development of a “Joint Statement on Strategic 
Stability” 
 
The above statement would be designed to seek a mutual understanding of the concept 
and identify guidelines for both sides to indicate which actions are seen as harmful or helpful for 
the maintenance of strategic stability. Both sides agreed that this type of effort could help reduce 
miscalculations and clarify a currently murky concept. Nonetheless, experts questioned the 
utility of such an exercise because it faced challenging conceptual and definitional issues. In 
particular, the Chinese side raised concerns over the complexity of cross-domain interactions and 
questioned whether the time was ripe for such a conversation. In part, the U.S. side agreed, 
owing to the low likelihood that it would accept mutual vulnerability with China anytime soon. 
 
Although there was agreement on the need to explore and define strategic stability, 
participants also agreed that it was too early to discuss these issues at the Track 1 level. Thus, a 
semi-official Track 2 or 1.5 effort to explore definitions, address each other’s concerns on how to 
maintain strategic stability, and identify potential language for official consideration seemed like 
the most productive next step. 
 
Measure 2: Bilateral Technical Exchanges on Verification 
Technology and Procedures 
 
Primarily, technical exchanges on verification were seen as a potential method to 
improve Chinese understanding on arms control processes and reestablish some level of lab-to-
lab cooperation. The Chinese side raised some concerns about such measures. One expert 
doubted China was ready to entertain the idea and recommended further consultations at the 
Track 2 level. Furthermore, another Chinese participant indicated that China’s lab community 
still viewed engagements with the United States negatively given past problems, and possessed 
an inferiority complex that would complicate cooperative efforts moving forward. However, 
when the discussion focused on “procedures” rather than “technologies” there was a greater 
degree of interest. This mixed Chinese response to such initiatives was in contrast to more 
positive responses during a breakout group on verification at the November 2013 Beijing 
meeting.  During the meetings in Beijing, experts from Chinese laboratories (such as CAEP) and 
PLA officers were interested in deeper discussion of verification as a useful avenue for bilateral 
cooperation and as a learning experience for China. An American expert also noted that in his 
meetings with Chinese experts over the past several years, they had seemed more supportive of 
technical exchanges on verification than expressed during this year’s breakout group in Hawaii.    
 
By contrast, the U.S. side viewed potential exchanges in a very positive light. These 
efforts could strengthen cooperation in line with leadership statements made at the Nuclear 
Security Summit, renew long-closed channels of technical cooperation, and lay the groundwork 
for multilateral arms control. Some American participants, however, questioned how these 
exchanges would directly address issues of strategic stability and areas of potential concern such 
as missile defense and crisis escalation. Although this CSBM discussion suggested that it might 
be too early to discuss these issues in a Track 1 context, further exchanges on verification should 
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occur to include discussions between technical experts on both sides, as well as an effort to help 
more general security experts understand the utility of verification. 
 
Measure 3: Joint Studies on Capabilities and Threat of DPRK 
Ballistic Missiles 
 
Strictly bilateral, private discussions on the threat posed by North Korean missiles were 
viewed by many on both sides as a way to monitor nonproliferation issues on the Korean 
Peninsula, develop shared understandings, and reassure China about the drivers of U.S. BMD. In 
particular, one Chinese participant showed an appreciation for the utility of such a measure.  
Impediments exist, however. Other Chinese participants voiced concern over a study being seen 
as cooperating with the United States against North Korea. One American expert believed joint 
studies “could lead to increased misunderstandings” and would not resolve China’s principal 
concerns. In this vein, a flawed joint study on Iran by the East-West Institute was raised as a 
useful failure to learn from. Some concerns about the challenges in fully explaining U.S. threat 
perceptions in the context of classification restrictions were also raised. 
 
Measure 4: Joint Statement on Escalation	  that both Countries 
Declare They: 	  
a. Acknowledge that conventional attacks (to include space and 
cyber) on components of their nuclear systems could provide 
justification for nuclear retaliation,  
b. Understand the escalation danger of conventional attacks on all 
components of the other’s nuclear retaliatory systems, and  
c. Thus intend to refrain from conducting such attacks, based on 
their mutual understanding of the potential consequences. 
 
This language was originally proposed by an American participant during the November 
2013 Beijing meeting—though there was limited discussion of it during that meeting. During the 
breakout group discussions in Hawaii this time, each side suggested changes in the CSBM’s 
language, although they also recognized that this measure would address sources of concern for 
both sides. There were some concerns about ambiguity in language, but the strongest opposition 
was against any pledge to limit attacks and behavior. In addition to a general reluctance to agree 
on any limitation on freedom of action, American participants suggested that this language could 
encourage Chinese co-mingling and, therefore, lead to greater instability and risks of crisis 
escalation. Chinese participants also worried that this measure could be seen as violating China’s 
NFU policy and legitimating nuclear responses to conventional attacks.  Both sides further raised 
questions regarding the definitions of “conventional attack” and “components” of nuclear 
systems. Moreover, the timing for such a measure did not seem appropriate, as pledges about 
how to fight a conventional war seem at odds with the focus in the bilateral relationship on 
deepening cooperation and avoiding crisis and conflict.  
 
Although there were some concerns about this measure, especially the pledge, 
participants from both sides recognized that their countries had questions over potential 
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ambiguity and escalation issues that needed to be discussed and addressed to enhance strategic 
stability. The participants proposed an amended consensus measure that included agreement that 
both sides “acknowledge that they understand the escalation risk of conventional attacks on the 
other’s nuclear systems.” To address some of the definitional ambiguities in the original measure, 
they also proposed that both sides should engage in further discussions on what each side values 
as vital strategic assets. Future discussions on definitions of “vital strategic assets” or 
“components of nuclear systems” would likely be valuable at the Track 1.5 level.   
 
Measure 5: Chinese Participation in Mock Inspections under New 
START or other Arms Control Treaty Protocols 
 
In previous dialogues, Chinese participants have asked about the feasibility of learning 
more about ongoing arms control processes, such as observing U.S.-Russian negotiations, 
receiving detailed briefings, or observing real inspections. American participants have responded 
with the possibility of Chinese participation in mock inspections. Such a bilateral action would 
be less sensitive and not require Russian approval, but would build confidence. Many on the U.S. 
side saw this measure as an “easy win,” especially since no Chinese participants in the breakout 
group raised objections. Both sides viewed it as a CSBM that would be a “positive learning 
exercise for potential (Chinese) involvement in future arms control” and more generally provide 
useful insights into the inspections process for China.  A Chinese participant labeled the CSBM a 
“good kind of preparation for China.” Some Americans questioned how Russia would respond to 
this measure and suggested that the U.S.-Russia relationship would likely need to be managed to 
fully implement this CSBM. The general consensus was that discussing such a measure at the 
official Track 1 level would be useful and productive.  
 
Measure 6: Reciprocal Visits to BMD Sites 
 
There was widespread agreement on both sides that such a proposal would not be 
technically or politically feasible. Visits would likely not be reassuring to the Chinese without 
sharing sensitive technical data, and even then China might not trust the information or observed 
tests. Furthermore, the United States would find it very difficult to share sensitive information 
and bring China to BMD sites, given U.S. political, legal, and operational restrictions. The 
Chinese participants were reluctant to admit China even possessed BMD sites to visit and 
questioned how reciprocity could ever be attained. 
 
Measure 7: Three Pledges of No First Attacks in Nuclear, Space, 
and Cyber 
 
This measure would rely on linked NFU pledges meant to enhance stability at the 
strategic level by providing reassurance in three offense-dominant domains where each side is 
vulnerable to the other. The Chinese observed that the pledges would likely enhance 
predictability and reduce misperception. Although these pledges could limit the potential for 
conflict and unintended escalation in multiple strategic domains, from the U.S. perspective, they 
would also challenge existing extended deterrence commitments. Moreover, participants 
questioned how such pledges would be credible, noting that they would likely become irrelevant 
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in a conflict. Similar to the concerns of other declaratory pledges, both sides expressed concern 
about how to clearly define “attacks” in a mutually satisfying way; these challenges would be 
greatest in the cyber domain. 
 
Smaller steps were suggested as possible alternatives to help build towards a broader 
pledge. Some suggestions included cooperative studies on the costs of space and cyber conflicts 
and Track 2 exercises to clearly define an attack and discuss the types of attacks that would be 
most destabilizing. The main outcome of the discussion was the sense that both sides needed 
further dialogue to flesh out definitions of what constituted an attack. In addition, pledges would 
only possess value if both sides could trust the other to follow through. The current state of the 
bilateral relationship does not imply trust levels have yet reached that point.  
 
Measure 8: Reciprocal Visits to Nuclear Test Sites 
 
This CSBM would involve reciprocal visits by U.S. and Chinese scientists to ensure 
CTBT compliance, a treaty that both countries have signed but not yet ratified. Success would 
demonstrate an ability to cooperate on an official level and move beyond the Cox Commission. 
Success would also be helpful in reducing some limited suspicions regarding CTBT compliance. 
Hurdles exist, though, especially on the U.S. side, where participants voiced concerns about the 
lab-to-lab nature of the measure and consequent congressional opposition. Equivalent access was 
also a concern for both sides and Chinese participants worried that bilateral work in this area 
might undercut the CTBT.  
 
Overall, most participants wanted to identify methods to restart lab-to-lab exchanges, 
whether they be related to CTBT, non-proliferation, or verification. If duplication of past lab-to-
lab cooperation proves impossible, they proposed other, work-around alternatives such as 
scientific and policy expert exchanges outside the lab umbrella but with its same authoritative 
character. Yet, if CTBT cheating is not a serious concern and current verification measures seem 
effective, the CTBT route for renewed lab-to-lab cooperation looks dead on arrival due to the 
political capital required to advance it. 
 
Measure 9: Reciprocal Notifications of BMD and Conventional 
Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) Test Launches 
 
Launch notifications could serve to reduce U.S. and Chinese misunderstandings 
regarding the capabilities and intentions of each other’s BMD and precision strike systems. 
Notifications would involve alerts to one another prior to test launches. Post-launch notifications 
were also discussed as an alternative. Understandably, U.S. and Chinese participants worried that 
pre-test notification could help disclose sensitive capabilities, particularly on Chinese systems 
given superior U.S. collection assets. Nonetheless, Chinese interlocutors also indicated that this 
measure would allow them greater access to U.S. research and development than they otherwise 
could collect. 
 
From the American perspective, this measure represented an important step toward 
further Chinese transparency. Such a proposal may also fit into the advance notification 
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framework outlined at the Xi-Obama Sunnylands summit. Consequently, the breakout group 
suggested that a working group might be created to further investigate the idea. This group 
would need to decide what types of activities should be included in an agreement and what 










0815-0845  Welcome Remarks: Outlining Common Strategic Interests  
 
0845-1015  Common Challenges and the Evolving Nuclear Strategic Environment 
What are the main strategic issues on which the U.S. and China share common 
interests and face common challenges (with “strategic” centering on nuclear 
issues, but also extending beyond)?  What are American and Chinese perceptions 
of recent developments in the regional and global strategic environment? What 
role do strategic nuclear issues play in the “new type of great power relations” 
framework?  What are the chances for further nuclear arms reductions and what 
role could both sides play in improving these prospects?    
 
1015-1030  Break 
 
1030-1230  Developments in Nuclear Modernization and Strategic Postures 
What are the major developments in each side’s nuclear capabilities and strategic 
posture over the last five years?  What continuities and changes do recent 
government and military reports (such as the QDR, Chinese Defense White Paper 
and 2013 edition of 战略学/Science of Strategy) contain on each side’s nuclear 
policy?  What concerns and questions does each side have about the other’s 
nuclear posture and ongoing modernization?  How does each side plan to 
incorporate non-nuclear strategic weapons, such as conventional hypersonic 
missiles, into their strategic posture?  How does each side view SSBNs as serving 
strategic stability? 
 
1230-1400 Lunch, Ocean 2 Ballroom 
 
1400-1600  Managing Crises and Avoiding Escalation  
If a serious crisis erupts, what factors in the U.S.-China context might 
challenge/undermine stability and increase the risk of escalation?  How might the 
asymmetry of conventional and nuclear capabilities affect the likelihood of 
escalation? Are there actions that either side might take (especially in the nuclear 
domain) that could inadvertently make the other side fearful and increase the 
chances of strategic escalation?  Are there aspects of both sides’ ongoing 
modernizations, both land and sea based, that might have a (positive or negative) 
effect on crisis stability?  What actions can both sides take to prevent and limit 







0830-1000 Evolving Views on Missile Defense 
What effect does each side believe its BMD will have on strategic stability?  What 
does each side view the main drivers for and recent changes in America’s BMD 
system?  Does the deployment of BMD systems signal anything about broader 
intentions?  How much of a challenge do current or anticipated BMD capabilities 
pose for China’s strategic deterrence?  Which current or future systems would 
pose the strongest threat to China’s deterrent capability?  What actions could 
either side take to address the other’s concerns over BMD?  What future 
developments are likely to lead each side to improve BMD capabilities?     
   
1000-1015  Break 
 
1015-1215  Breakout Sessions: Confidence and Security Building Measures  
  Matsonia Room, Mariposa Room, and Ocean 1 Ballroom 
 
1215-1400  Lunch, Ocean 1 Ballroom Pre-function Lanai 
 
1400-1530  Plenary Session: Confidence and Security Building Measures  
 
In the plenary session, each breakout group will present the key points of 
agreement, disagreement, and new questions that emerged in their group’s 
discussion of specific CSBMs.  We hope to be able to make recommendations to 
our governments on the feasibility, importance, and order of priority for these 
CSBMs. 
 
1530-1600  Implications and Ways Forward 
  
  
 
	  
